Abstract
Introduction
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) developed a theory of utility as an essential component of a theory of play for strategic games. Their utility theory, now known as expected utility theory, is based on a set of axioms for a preference ordering of probability distributions of "prizes." The set of axioms includes the independence axiom which gives an expected utility functional representing the axioms its defining characteristic of linearity in probabilities. It was clearly understood in classic work (e.g., Luce and Raiffa, 1957, Ch. 2) that the axioms do not specify the identity of the prizes, such as scalar amounts of terminal wealth or income or, alternatively, commodity vectors. A difference in the assumed identity of the prizes is the characteristic that distinguishes one expected utility model from another. Failure in recent literature to distinguish between expected utility theory all models based on a set of axioms that includes the independence axiom and a specific expected utility model has led to incorrect conclusions.
For example, Rabin and Thaler (2001, p. 221) building on earlier work by Rabin (2000) state that they "… establish the implausibility of expected utility theory by showing that absurd large-stakes risk aversion … follow inherently from non-negligible modest-scale risk aversion …." Validity of this Rabin-Thaler conclusion has been accepted in the academic literature (Kahneman, 2003; Camerer and Thaler, 2003) and general readership literature (The Economist, 2001 ) and in the award literature for the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences (Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 2002, p. 16 ).
This paper explains that the concavity-calibration argument, as developed by Rabin (2000) , does not logically support the implausibility conclusion about expected utility theory. Our explanation in section 2 begins with the original Rabin (2000) assumption that an agent will reject a 50-50 small-stakes gamble at all positive initial wealth levels. The section 2 explanation continues by providing: (a) an accessible demonstration that this small-stakes risk aversion assumption and globally-concave utility do imply implausible large-stakes risk aversion for the expected utility of terminal wealth model (see Rabin, 2000 for an original proof); and (b) a counterexample to illustrate that the small-stakes risk aversion assumption and global concavity do not imply implausible large-stakes risk aversion for the expected utility of income model.
Since this small-stakes risk aversion assumption of Rabin (2000) does not imply implausible large-stakes risk aversion for the expected utility of income model, the conclusion by Rabin and Thaler (2001) that their arguments "establish the implausibility of expected utility theory" does not stand. Rubinstein ( , 2004 ) presents a critique in a similar spirit.
The expected utility of income model is widely used in the theory of auctions. 1 However, the model does not provide an explanation of how an agent's initial wealth affects its attitude towards risk. In order to be able to analyze the effects of initial wealth on risk-taking behavior, one needs a model in which risk attitude does depend on initial wealth. In order for a model to withstand the Rabin critique, initial wealth must not be additive to income in the utility function. This is our motivation for introducing, in section 3, an expected utility model in which the arguments of the utility function are ordered pairs of initial wealth and income. To demonstrate that this new model, the expected utility of initial wealth and income model, may have fruitful applications we extend the Arrow (1971) and Pratt (1964) characterization of comparative risk aversion to it. The new expected utility model is not subject to Rabin's (2000) critique because his risk aversion assumption does not imply implausible large-stakes risk aversion for this model, as we illustrate with a counterexample.
Explaining that Rabin's (2000) small-stakes risk aversion assumption has no general implication for expected utility theory is the first topic addressed. Another topic addressed in this (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and other decision theories are subjected to a concavity-calibration critique. Furthermore, loss aversion is not a solution to the problems for decision theory that may follow from concavity calibration because our alternative small-stakes risk aversion assumption (in section 4) holds in the domain of positive money payoffs, which makes loss aversion irrelevant to the argument. 2 This finding contradicts a conclusion by Rabin and Thaler (2001, p. 230 ) that loss aversion is a "key component" of a decision theory that can survive concavity calibration critique.
Implications of the Rabin Risk Aversion Assumption for Expected Utility Theory
In this section we re-examine the Rabin-Thaler (2001) Rabin's (2000) analysis of the implications of small-stakes risk aversion begins with the assumption that an agent with (weakly) concave Bernoulli utility function will reject a smallstakes gamble with even odds of winning or losing relatively small amounts, and that the agent will do this at all positive initial wealth levels. 3 We examine the implications of this assumption:
(a) when the prizes are amounts of terminal wealth; and (b) when the prizes are amounts of income.
Implications for the Expected Utility of Terminal Wealth Model
Consider the expected utility of terminal wealth model, the model based on the expected utility axioms and the assumption that the prizes are amounts of terminal wealth. An accessible demonstration of the logic of concavity calibration for a differentiable utility function is as follows.
Assume that an agent rejects the gamble that involves a monetary gain of 110 and loss of 100, with even odds, for all values of initial wealth w greater than 100. ) from initial wealth w > L is larger than 11 210 × . Statements (*) and (**) and transitivity imply that the increase in utility from a gain of any amount G , no matter how large, is strictly smaller than the decrease in utility from a loss of 680 , 1
(or any larger loss) at any w bigger than the loss amount. This is a sufficient condition for rejection of any even-odds gamble, no matter how large the gain, that involves a loss of 680 , 1
(or more). Therefore, the assumed pattern of plausible small-stakes risk aversion implies implausible large-stakes risk aversion for the expected utility of terminal wealth model.
Implications for the Expected Utility of Income Model
Now consider the expected utility of income model, the model based on the expected utility axioms and the assumption that the prizes are amounts of income (or changes in wealth).
We shall demonstrate that the Rabin (2000) small-stakes risk aversion assumption does not imply implausible large-stakes risk aversion for this model.
Let μ denote the agent's Bernoulli utility function for income. A necessary condition for rejecting an even-odds gamble with loss amount and gain amount g at all wealth levels > w is:
It should be expected that the Rabin concavity calibration has no large-stakes risk aversion implications for this model because inequality (4) does not depend on w . In order to explicate comparison with the terminal wealth model, we consider the same small-stakes gamble as in section 2.1: receive -100 or +110 with even odds. An example of a Bernoulli utility function μ for income y that rejects the gamble with outcomes -100 or +110 with even odds, for all 100 > w , and has plausible large-stakes risk aversion is: 
An even odds gamble with loss amount and gain amount G will be rejected (accepted) for all gain amounts G strictly smaller (larger) than ) ( g . Hence, the even-odds lottery with outcomes of -100 and +110 is rejected since the gain amount 110 is strictly smaller than 149 ) 100 ( ≈ g . However, in contrast to the terminal wealth model, the agent with utility of income function (5) would accept an even-odds gamble with loss 1,680 and gain at least 3,412 since that is strictly larger than . 411 , 3 ) 680 , 1 ( ≈ g 6 Thus, the assumed pattern of risk aversion over small-stakes gambles does not imply implausible risk aversion over large-stakes gambles with this expected utility model.
Expected Utility of Initial Wealth and Income Model
The expected utility of income model is widely used in the theory of auctions but this model does not provide an explanation of how an agent's initial wealth affects its attitude towards risk. In this section we consider a model in which risk attitude depends on initial wealth but income is not additive to initial wealth.
Assume that the arguments of the utility function are ordered pairs of initial wealth and income. Let υ denote the agent's "Bernoulli" utility function for initial wealth and income. For any integrable probability distribution function G for random income y , the expected utility functional for this model is written as
where the function υ is strictly increasing in both arguments and (resp. strictly) concave in its second argument if the agent is (resp. strictly) risk averse. Although, in this model, risk attitude depends on initial wealth, the model is not called into question by the type of global small-stakes risk aversion assumed in previous literature, as we shall now demonstrate.
Rationalizing Small-and Large-Stakes Risk Aversion
For the model of initial wealth and income, a necessary condition for rejecting an evenodds gamble with loss amount and gain amount g for all positive w is (7) ) ,
We present an example of a "Bernoulli" function utility υ that both satisfies inequality (7) for small-stakes risky lotteries and has plausible large-stakes risk aversion implications. To keep things comparable among the three expected utility models, we consider the same small-stakes gamble as in sections 2.1 and 2.2, the even-odds gamble with outcomes -100 and +110.
Consider the following "Bernoulli" utility function υ for initial wealth w and income : y This utility function satisfies the pattern of risk aversion assumed by Rabin (2000) and at the same time it has plausible large-stakes risk aversion, as shown below.
For the utility function (8) 
Comparative Risk Aversion
Having observed that the expected utility of initial wealth and income model is Define the function g as follows: (12) )). ,
The measures of comparative risk attitudes for agents α and β are as given in the following proposition, which states that: (i) the absolute risk aversion measure for agent α is greater than the absolute risk aversion measure for agent β , if and only if, (ii) the risk premium for agent α is greater than the risk premium for agent β , if and only if, (iii) the utility function for agent α is a strictly increasing and strictly concave transformation of the utility function of agent β of the form given by the definition in equation (12). 
, for all w and G;
Proof: See appendix B.
Proposition 1 makes clear that the Arrow-Pratt characterization of agents' comparative risk aversion can be extended from the expected utility of terminal wealth model to the twoargument, expected utility of initial wealth and income model which is not called into question by Rabin's (2000) concavity-calibration arguments. Hence, rather than using the expected utility of income model, agents' risk-avoiding behavior can be modeled with the new model. 
More Implications of Concavity Calibration for Decision Theory
In sections 2 and 3, we demonstrated that the Rabin (2000) small-stakes risk aversion assumption has implausible large-stakes risk aversion implications for only one of the three expected utility models that we examined. This was the first question addressed in this paper.
This section addresses another question: What are the possible implications of concavity calibration for decision-theoretic models other than the expected utility of terminal wealth model?
We present a concavity calibration proposition for functionals that represent preferences on a lottery space that may not be linear in probabilities (as are expected utility functionals). This more general concavity calibration proposition identifies small-stakes risk aversion assumptions for which all decision theories that involve concave transformations of positive money payoffs have implausible large-stakes risk aversion. This alternative pattern of small-stakes risk aversion may or may not have empirical validity, but the analysis makes it clear that the logic of concavity calibration has no unique implication for expected utility theory; either concavity calibration has no general implication for expected utility theory (because it does not apply to the expected utility of income model nor to the expected utility of initial wealth and income model), or it has problematic implications for all decision theories that involve concave transformations of positive money payoffs.
Implications for Decision Theory of an Alternative Pattern of Risk Aversion
Consider binary gambles that pay the amount of income x with probability p and the amount of income y with probability , 
Interpretations with Alternative Decision Theories
We here offer some interpretations of Proposition 2 for models from two alternative decision theories, expected utility theory and cumulative prospect theory. First consider the three expected utility models discussed in sections 2 and 3 of this paper, the terminal wealth model, the income model, and the initial wealth and income model. Let the preference ordering over lotteries according to any of these three models be represented by the functional ) , ( U id E = , where id denotes the identity map which is the probability transformation for expected utility theory. is an E-favorable risky gamble.
For all three expected utility models discussed above, applying Proposition 2 and using the constructive proof in appendix C, part C.2, one has: rejection of this risky gamble in favor of a certain amount of income x, for all x >100, implies rejection of any even-odds lottery that involves a lower outcome less than z-1,680 in favor of receiving a certain amount z (z >1,680), no matter how large is the high outcome. An example is: 6,000 for sure is preferred to an even-odds lottery with low outcome of 4,000 and any arbitrarily-large high outcome. Thus we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Any of the three expected utility models predict: if
Note that the examples of utility functions given in equations (5) and (8) do not satisfy the antecedent statement in Corollary 1 and, therefore, the corollary does not apply to those preferences.
Next consider cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) . Let P = (W,v) denote the functional that represents the preference ordering according to this theory. Since all outcomes are positive, the relevant money transformation function is the concave value function for gains and the relevant probability transformation function is given by the probability 
in favor of receiving z for sure, for all 680 , 1 > L and L z > (see appendix C, part C.3). Again, the example reported above survives (in a more extreme form): the gamble of receiving 4,000 with probability 0.36 or any positive amount with probability 0.64 is rejected in favor of receiving 6,000 for sure. The following corollary summarizes these findings.
Corollary 2. Cumulative prospect theory P with the probability transformation function W, as
reported in the literature, predicts:
Therefore, the presently-assumed global small-stakes risk aversion and concavity of the value function for positive amounts of money imply implausible large-stakes risk aversion with cumulative prospect theory.
The assumption in Proposition 2 that an agent prefers the certain amount of money x to a 
Concluding Remarks
This paper explains that the type of global small-stakes risk aversion assumed in previous literature (Rabin, 2000; Rabin and Thaler, 2001) has no implication for the expected utility of income model, hence no general implication for expected utility theory. However, an agent's risk attitude with the income model does not depend on initial wealth. This is our motivation for discussion of a two-argument model for which risk attitude does depend on initial wealth. We show that this model is immune to the concavity-calibration critique in previous literature. An extension of the Arrow-Pratt characterization of comparative risk aversion to this new model is presented, demonstrating that this two-argument model may have fruitful applications.
In order to explore the implications of concavity calibration for decision theory, we present a concavity calibration proposition that does not assume linearity in probabilities. This proposition, together with an alternative pattern of global small-stakes risk aversion, provides a concavity-calibration critique that applies to all expected utility models reported in this paper, to cumulative prospect theory, and to other decision theories that involve concave money transformation functions for positive money payoffs. 12 The alternative assumed pattern of risk aversion holds in the domain of gains, which makes loss aversion irrelevant to the argument. This makes it clear that loss aversion does not provide a way around any problems for decision theory that follow from concavity calibration. This new pattern of small-stakes risk aversion, as assumed in Proposition 2, may or may not have empirical validity; the central role of Proposition 2 in the analysis is to make clear that concavity calibration has no unique implication for expected utility theory. 13 Instead, concavity calibration either has no general implication for expected utility theory or it has problematic implications for all decision theories with concave transformation (utility or value) functions for positive money payoffs.
Endnotes
1. Vickrey (1961) first developed Nash equilibrium bidding theory based on the expected utility axioms. He mainly developed the theory for the special case of risk neutral bidders, for which there is no essential distinction between the expected utility of terminal wealth model and the expected utility of income model. Later authors used the expected utility of income model to develop Nash equilibrium bidding theory for risk averse agents. See, for examples: Holt (1980) , Harris and Raviv (1981) , Riley and Samuelson (1981) , Cox, Smith, and Walker (1982), Milgrom and Weber (1982) , Matthews (1983) , Maskin and Riley (1984) , and Moore (1984) . The bid functions for risk averse bidders presented in these papers do not satisfy the best reply property of Nash equilibrium if one assumes that the argument of the utility function is terminal wealth rather than income. Appendix A provides an illustration.
2. Loss aversion can be incorporated into a decision-theoretic model by assuming a utility or value function for income that has a kink at zero income and is steeper in the loss domain than in the gain domain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) . While it has been featured in discussions of prospect theory, loss aversion is also consistent with the expected utility of income model and the new expected utility model introduced in this paper.
3. Rabin (2000) examines the implications of rejection of this small-stakes gamble for all , I w∈ where I is either an infinite or sufficiently large finite interval. We focus on the infinite interval in order to simplify the exposition of concavity calibration.
4. The wealth levels at which the small-stakes gamble is assumed to be rejected are required to be greater than the loss amount in the gamble (here, 100) because negative terminal wealth is not well-defined. (9)) that is decreasing in both income and wealth.
8. Note that, as presently developed this model shares some limitations with the expected utility of income model, prospect theory, and other models defined on income: it does not rule out certain types of anomalies (see Rubinstein (2004) for an illustration). Detailed analysis of possible "money pump" preference cycles and other violations of full rationality are beyond the scope of the present paper, which is concerned with the implications of concavity calibration for decision theories. 9. Proposition 2 holds for non-differentiable f as well. Furthermore, implausible large-stakes risk aversion is implied even if small-stakes risk aversion is assumed to hold in a (large enough) finite interval instead of the infinite one. An alternative proposition (and proof) that relaxes differentiability of f and the infinite interval assumption is available upon request to the authors.
10. The lower outcome L z − is required to be positive in order to make loss aversion irrelevant to the argument.
11. We thank Martin Dufwenberg for bringing this to our attention.
12. An example of a decision theory that does not involve concave transformation of money payoffs is provided by Yaari's (1987) dual theory of choice under risk. The "utility functional" that represents the dual theory preference ordering is always linear in money payoffs but is linear in probabilities only if the agent is risk neutral.
13. The empirical credibility of Rabin's (2000) risk aversion assumption is disputed in PalaciosHuerta, Serrano, and Volij (2003) and in Cox and Sadiraj (2001) . In ongoing empirical research, we are attempting to obtain data that can shed light on the empirical validity of Rabin's assumption and the alternative risk aversion assumption in Proposition 2.
Appendix A. Bidding Theory for Risk Averse Agents Works with the Expected Utility of Income Model
In order to appreciate that the terminal wealth model is not used in the literature on bidding theory, consider a special case example from the theory of first-price sealed-bid auctions of single items with independent private values (Cox, Smith, and Walker, 1982 Examples using other Nash equilibrium bid functions in the literature lead to the same conclusion that the required best reply property is not satisfied if one uses the expected utility of terminal wealth model rather than the expected utility of income model. 
